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Jonathan L. Mayes1
The United States and England continue to limit the right to trial by jury.  Courts 
have heavily restricted this right in environmental cost-recovery and contribution actions 
– a right that is mandated by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 By 
limiting this constitutional right, courts have moved the jury trial – the last vestige of true 
democracy – to the outer fringes of the judicial process on the verge of obscurity.
Citizens cannot sit idly by as courts whittle away at this great “bulwark of our liberties” –
the trial by jury.3
Some of the greatest countries in history – Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, 
England and the United States – included the jury trial in the construction of their 
democratic structures.4 The strength of these nations and their use of the jury system is 
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 Christopher G. Smith, The Right to Trial by Jury in CERCLA Cost-Recovery and Contribution Actions, 25 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10185 (1995): “Nearly all parties seeking to obtain trial by jury in a cost-recovery or 
contribution action under the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) have failed.”  Id.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. III p. 275 
(Wayne Morrison, ed. 2001).
4 LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 1-114 (2nd ed. 1973); JOHN 
PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY §§ 4-40 (1876); SAMUEL W. MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY: A 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE JURY SYSTEM 1-20 (4th ed. 1970); CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE 
JURY 39-63 (1962).  See generally MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY 
SYSTEM (1894); WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1875).  While many scholars debate the 
origin of the jury system (LESSER, supra, at 6-9; FORSYTH, supra, at 1-5), the earliest record of a jury 
system appears to be the dikasteries of Athens.  LESSER, supra, at 14-28; PROFFATT, supra, § 6.  There may 
have been earlier trials of the Greek gods as set forth in Aeschylus’ play Eumenides where the patron 
2not coincidental.  Jurist from around the world have waxed eloquent in describing the 
importance of the jury trial.  Sir William Blackstone5 said,
[The jury trial’s] establishment however and use, in this island, of what 
date soever [sic] it be, though for a time greatly impaired and shaken by 
the introduction of the Norman trial by battel [sic], was always so highly 
esteemed and valued by the people, that no conquest, no change of 
government, could ever prevail to abolish it.6
Justice Joseph Story7 remarked, “The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people.
It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment 
upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”8 Alexis de Tocqueville also observed this 
romance with the jury system as he considered its importance in both England and 
America: 
goddess of wisdom is credited with the founding of the jury.  MOORE, supra, at 1.  However, the dikasteries 
appear to be the most tangible record of the earliest jury.  Id.  The Athenians would select panels of 500 
citizens who had taken a solemn oath to judge the law and try facts in trials presided over by a magistrate 
who submitted the question at issue before the accused, the accuser, and their witnesses gave statements.  
Id.  Around 450 B.C., Decemvirs introduced the Romans to the Athenian tradition of jury trials when he 
traveled to Athens to investigate the laws of Solon.  MOORE, supra, at 2-3.  The Roman system was similar 
to the Greek system in selection of the members and compensation but differed in the separation of law and 
fact, due process requirements, and the jury’s indirect influence on the judgment.  LESSER, supra, at 44.  
The Romans incorporated the practice of separating questions of law and fact into the Justinian Code.  Id. 
at 45.  The Roman Empire fell removing Roman rule from England and allowing the Celtics and others to 
rule various parts until the Anglo-Saxons triumphed wiping out the remnants of the Roman rule.   Id. at 59.  
The Saxons continued the development of the jury trial.  Id. at 74-86.  However, in 1066 A.D., William the 
Conqueror defeated the Anglo-Saxons, but did not bring radical change to the institution of the jury as the 
Saxons did in their triumph.  Id. at 89.  The reign of William brought with it the foundation of English 
common law, which the U.S. adopted to a vast extent in the late eighteenth century.  Id. at 87.  
5
 Blackstone was both a judge and a jurist, but it is his works off the bench that has given him the most 
recognized name in Anglo-American jurisprudence.  BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 57 
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., Butterworths 1984) [hereinafter Simpson].  Blackstone received his bachelor and 
doctorate degrees from Oxford and taught at Oxford.  Id.  The searching of “unreadable tomes” of legal 
history “left an indelible and distasteful mark on Blackstone and helped to persuade him of the need for a 
readable treatise on English law.”  Id. at 58.  His four volumes of The Commentaries on the Laws of 
England provided readable treatises on English law and won him international fame.  Id. at 60.  Blackstone 
finished his career without accomplishing much in the House of Commons or on the bench.  Id. at 60-61.  
He sat on the bench for the Court of Common Pleas from 1770-1780 where his tenure is described as “not 
distinguished.”  Id. at 59.  Sir William Blackstone died in 1780 at age 57.  Simpson, supra at 60.    
6 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND III p. 349 (1768).
7
 Justice Story graduated second in his class from Harvard University in 1798 at the age of nineteen.  
HTTP://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/amistad/AMI_BSTO.HTM (last visited November 15, 
2003).  Upon graduation, he served the state of Massachusetts in the legislature, Congress, and as Speaker 
of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.  Id. At age 32, he was appointed by James Madison to the 
United States Supreme Court.  Id.  Oliver Wendall Holmes said of Story: “[He has] done more than any 
other English-speaking man in this century to make the law luminous and easy to understand.”  Id.
8
 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.).
3I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but 
I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; and I 
look upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the education of 
people which society can employ.9
Yet these warm remarks lie in stark contrast to the relentless assault on the storied jury 
systems in the United States and England.10
Jury trials have fallen on hard times.11 Though England will not likely abolish the 
jury, English courts have drastically limited their use.12 In contrast, U.S. courts have 
taken a much more liberal approach in expanding the use of civil juries,13 but they have 
almost uniformly denied the right to trial by jury in contribution and cost-recovery 
actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).14
This Note addresses one main issue: whether or not a right to trial by jury under 
CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions, and their English counterpart(s), exists.  
9 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA I 290 (Rev. ed. 1899).  De Tocqueville also noted the 
educational and historical importance of the jury trial:
When the English adopted trial by jury they were a semi-barbarous people; they are 
become, in course of time, one of the most enlightened nations of the earth; and their 
attachment to this institution seems to have increased with their increasing cultivation.  
They soon spread beyond their insular boundaries to every corner of the habitable globe; 
some have formed colonies, others, independent states; the mother-country has 
maintained its monarchical constitution; many of its offspring have founded powerful 
republics; but wherever the English have been they have boasted of the privilege of trial 
by jury.  They have established it, or hastened to re-establish it, in all their settlements.  A 
judicial institution which obtains the suffrages of a great people for so long a series of 
ages, which is zealously renewed at every epoch of civilization, in all the climates of the 
earth and under every form of human government, cannot be contrary to the spirit of 
justice.
Id. at 286.  
10 See generally PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (1984); ELLEN S. 
SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY (2001).
11
 R.M. Jackson, The Incidence of Jury Trial During the Past Century, 1 MODERN L. REV. 132 (1937). “A 
glance at the Index to Legal Periodicals shows that attacks upon and defence [sic] of the jury system are 
frequent themes for legal writers.”  Id.  Jackson’s article presents empirical data of the decline of jury trials 
in England.  See also DIPERNA and SWARD and supra text accompanying note 9.
12 S.H. BAILEY et al, SMITH, BAILEY AND GUNN ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1035-1039 (4th
ed. 2002)
13
 Montgomery Kersten, Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. 
REV. 99 (1979): “While the Court has extended the seventh amendment into areas it did not cover in 1791, 
the Court simply has not indicated a willingness to cut back on its scope.”  Id. at 103.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 100-105.
4Past scholarly publications have discussed closely related issues offering helpful legal 
analysis, but their historical analysis of cost-recovery and contribution actions is 
somewhat abbreviated.15  This Note fills the void providing a much needed, in-depth 
historical perspective, for it is the history of environmental laws that ultimately 
determines whether or not a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury attaches.16
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the issue leaving the law even 
more unsettled in an increasingly important area of law.17 The United States and England 
continue to conduct jury trials, but their developments of the doctrine greatly contrast.18
Nevertheless, the analysis of the U.S. doctrine depends on the history of English law.  
Comparing United States and English law accomplishes two objectives: first, it 
reveals the origins of United States’ jury trial doctrine since the United States adopted 
English common law doctrine at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution,19 and, 
second, it tracks both countries’ use of the jury trial in environmental-response actions.  
As the discussion will reveal, the analysis in the United States inevitably requires 
understanding of the history of English law, and the discussion of English law provides a 
basis to understand America’s adoption of the English theories of law.20
15See Smith, supra note 2; David Elbaum, Judicial Review of Natural Resource Damage Assessments 
Under CERCLA: Implications of the Right to Trial by Jury, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 352 (1995).
16 Infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
17
 Smith, supra note 2, text accompanying n.3. David M. Driesen, Thirty Years if International 
Environmental Law: A Retrospective and Plea for Reinvigoration, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 353 
(2003).  “[S]cholars and students began to recognize that international environmental law had become an 
important field . . .” Id. at 353.  See generally Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions 
in Environmental Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991) (traces the emerging societal importance of 
prosecution of environmental crimes).
18 PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 31 (3rd ed. 1966).
19
 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935): “[H]ere we are dealing with a constitutional provision 
which has in effect adopted the rules of the common law in respect of trial by jury as these rules existed in 
1791.”  Id.  Justice Story referred to the common law of England as “the grand reservoir of all our 
jurisprudence.”  United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
20
 From a look at present and past governments, England and its sister governments – including the U.S. –
appear to remain the lone nations with jury trials available in judicial proceedings.  MOORE, supra note 4, at 
115-120.  While many countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, and several Scandinavian countries 
5Part I will discuss the American response to the issue by exploring the origins of 
U.S. environmental law, the purpose of CERCLA, followed by application of canons of 
statutory interpretation to germane CERCLA statutes, examining the congressional 
record, and analysis of U.S. court decisions. Plaintiffs face a myriad of options through 
statutory or common-law actions when pursing recompense for environmental actions,21
but this Note focuses on claims under CERCLA22 and its English counterpart(s).  
Specifically, the discussion will focus on sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA.23  Courts 
have incorrectly analogized CERCLA actions to restitution actions instead of the proper 
eighteenth-century analogs – nuisance or trespass.
Part II discusses the English response to the presented issue by discovering the 
origins of the English environmental laws, finding the counterpart to CERCLA cost-
recovery and contribution actions, and then examining trial by jury in the related English 
environmental actions.  English common law dating back to before the eighteenth century 
provided the theoretical foundation for modern environmental acts.  Proper analysis of 
these common law actions reveal the correct eighteenth-century analog to U.S.
environmental actions, but this section continues to follow the environmental actions, and 
the use of juries in such actions, into the present.
Part III explores the implications of the trial by jury in environmental cost-
recovery and contribution actions.  Many scholars question the jury system’s
effectiveness in one way or another even though jury trials remain a common thread in 
have adopted a jury system at some point in their history, they all have failed to certain degrees and several 
of these countries have replaced the jury with a “lay assessors” system, quite different from the jury system.  
Id.  However, the jury has survived in Scotland and continues to thrive in Ireland where many civil trials go 
before juries.  Id.  Even during the height of the use of juries, only a handful of countries retained the 
system and no continental country introduced the jury into their judicial system.  Id.
21
 Plaintiffs may choose between common law nuisance or trespass claims or they may bring actions based 
in statutory law such as CERCLA. Infra text accompanying notes 29-45.
22 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601- 9675 as amended)
23
 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613.  
6the legal fabric of the American and English legal systems.24  The focus of the criticism
attempts to explain that juries can no longer handle the now increasingly difficult task of 
sifting through esoteric legal terms and complex legal theories.25 Critics argue theories of 
efficiency plead for a trial by a judge rather than a jury of peers.26  However, courts can 
easily mitigate or eliminate these concerns.
I. THE UNITED STATES
A Brief History of U.S. Environmental Laws
Modern environmental law began to develop during the post-World War II 
decades of the 1950’s and 1960’s,27 but common law actions, providing avenues of relief 
for environmental harm, existed before then.  Common law actions, such as public 
nuisance and trespass claims inherited from the English courts of law, created the basis 
for legislative act that in turn laid the foundation for CERCLA. 28
The United States recognized the law of nuisance in the eighteenth century as an 
action in courts of law or equity29 with nuisance law being a vehicle for recovery in 
24
 Jackson, supra note 11, at 132.
25
 Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals 
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 444 n.5 (1997)
26 Id.
27 MATTHEW BENDER, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.01 (2002).   For an insightful study on the 
development of natural resources environmental law in the U.S., see Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and 
Pollution: Some Intersections Between Law and History, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 423 (1975).
28
 G. Nelson Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction 
and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (1995).
29
 William Draper Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Establish 
His Right at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1908); Note, Trial by Jury in Suits to Enjoin Nuisances, 25 
COLUM. L.REV. 641 (1925); Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362 (Conn. 1792) (a nuisance action lies when 
someone alters a navigable waterway to the detriment of another); Nichols v. Pixly, 1 Root 129 (Conn. 
1789) (no action for nuisance lies if a person constructing a dam received a license to do so).  Early 
recognition by the States of Sir William Blackstone’s sic utere tuo rule (“causing injury to someone’s 
enjoyment of property creates a cause for recovery”) can be found in Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (N.Y. 
1849) (property owners have a right to construct a canal on their property, but they are not allowed to blast 
rocks onto neighboring land).  H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A 
7environmental claims.30 Courts defined public nuisance as “a wrong affecting an interest 
‘common to the general public, rather than to one peculiar individual or several.’”31
These early cases typically involved pollution of a water source,32 blasting of rocks onto 
property,33 or other general violations of a citizen’s right to the natural use and enjoyment 
of his own property.34 Nuisance claims sounded in law when claimants pursued monetary 
damages and in equity when they pursued injunctive relief.35
Similarly, plaintiffs brought trespass actions to recoup damages to land, an action 
distinct from nuisance.  An action in trespass allowed landowners to recover for invasions 
which interfered with their right of exclusive possession of the land as a direct result from 
the acts of the defendant.36  Nuisance involves merely interference with use and 
enjoyment.37 Early cases in American history dealt with infringement caused by 
misplaced water flow,38 damming of water,39 and other forms of launching materials onto 
Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model for the 
Future, 30 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 541, 546-554 (1997).
30
 Susan Verdicchio, Environmental Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 188 (1985); 
“The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are found in principles of nuisance. . . . 
Nuisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law.”  
WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY 120-121 (1992).
31
 L. Mark Walker & Dale E. Cottingham, An Abridged Primer on the Law of Public Nuisance, 30 TULSA 
L. J. 355, 357 (1994) citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 88, at 585 (4th ed. 
1971).
32
 Walker, supra note 31, at 358.
33
 Green, supra note 29, at 548.
34 Id.
35
 N.A.A.C.P. v. A.A. Arms, Inc., 2003 WL 1049011 (E.D. N.Y. 2003):
It is well settled that nuisance claims seeking solely injunctive relief are equitable in 
nature. Cases and authorities cited by the defendant for the proposition that nuisance
claims are historically legal are nuisance claims where money damages were sought in 
addition to injunctive relief or cases where the legal issue presented was not in actuality 
one of public nuisance. Plaintiff does not seek damages, but exclusively equitable relief.  
Id. at 5 (citations omitted). See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 220-22 
(1765-69).
36 WILLIAM  L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 67 (5th ed. 1984).
37 Id. at 70.
38
 Id. at 69.
39
 Id.
8the land of another,40 but later cases showed a trend towards allowing suit for 
environmental damages such as pollution caused by asphalt poisoning a pond41 or 
projection of chemical compounds in gaseous or particulate form onto neighboring land.42
The line separating nuisance actions from trespass actions when dealing with invisible
gas or microscopic particles has become quite blurred.43  Nevertheless, the truth remains 
that the common law ancestors of nuisance and trespass law produced the theoretical 
framework for modern environmental law.44
When common law actions failed to produce a solution to the growing problem of 
pollution, statutes such as CERCLA preempted nuisance and trespass actions.45  The 
movement in the post-World War II era sprang from two separate purposes and groups: 
first, to conserve the creation around us and preserve it for posterity and, second, to
protect the humans.46 The first group began with the likes of President Theodore 
Roosevelt who sought to conserve the quality of life, natural resources, and the 
40
 Id. at 68.
41
 Id. at 71.
42 PROSSER, supra note 36, at 71. 
43 Id.
44
 Smith, supra note 2, at 40: “Ironically, while the [current environmental law] statutes themselves are 
relatively new, they are based in the common law remedies of nuisance and trespass.”
45
 Verdicchio, supra note 30, at 183: “Before the enactment of state and federal environmental protection 
legislation, common law actions were the only vehicles for advancing environmental claims.  Indeed, one 
of the reasons for enacting environmental laws was because private litigation was inadequate to protect the 
public interest inherent in natural resources.”  Id.  However, the actions of nuisance and trespass to land 
still may be used by plaintiffs in environmental damages cases.  See Smith, III, supra note 28.  There 
appears to be some dispute as to whether federal common law of nuisance exists.  “In addition, even if this 
were an appropriate area for federal common law, any such common law has been preempted by the 
enactment of the RCRA and, more recently, [CERCLA].”  U.S. v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.C. 
N.J., 1981), aff’d 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982).  The court in U.S. v. Argent Corp., 1983 WL 354 (D.N.M. 
1983) held CERCLA did not preempt federal common law claims of nuisance because there was simply no 
federal common law nuisance theories. Id.  However, that court failed to take notice of Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co., 205 U.S. 230 (1907), where the U.S. Supreme Court applied federal common law 
nuisance to a dispute between neighboring states.  Id. See also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).  
Furthermore, the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) recognized “new federal laws and 
new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of common law of nuisance” in holding that the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 pre-empted the federal common law of 
nuisance.  Id. at 314.
46
 BENDER, supra note 27, § 1.01.
9outdoors.47 The second group primarily acted in the interests of public health.48 The 
public became acutely aware of the risks involved in environmental harm as pollution of 
water sources, air pollution, and major oil spills began to raise public health concerns.49
Necessity being the mother of invention, the legislature responded to the need for federal 
pollution control and enacted legislation beginning in 1956.50  A plethora of 
environmental acts were passed during the 1960’s and 1970’s that covered solid waste,51
air pollution,52 toxic waste,53 water pollution,54 and established the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”).55  Then CERCLA arrived.
The purpose of CERCLA is quite clear: persons or entities that cause damage by 
releasing hazardous substances will pay for the clean up.56  In expanding upon this view, 
courts have also interpreted the purpose: 
[T]o encourage maximum care and responsibility in the handling of 
hazardous waste; to provide for rapid response to environmental 
emergencies; to encourage voluntary clean-up of hazardous waste spills; 
to encourage early reporting of violations of the statute; and to ensure that 
parties responsible for release of hazardous substances bear the costs of 
response and costs of damage to natural resources.57
47 Id.  Bender refers to this camp as the “high-road environmentalists.”  Id.
48 Id.  Conversely, this camp was known as the “low-road environmentalists.”  Id.
49 Id.
50 BENDER, supra note 27, § 1.01.
51
 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6991 (Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965).
52
 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq (Clean Air Act revision in 1977).
53
 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976). 
54
 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (Clean Water Act revision of 1977).
55
 The EPA was established by President Richard M. Nixon in July of 1970 to consolidate the powers of the 
executive branch in regulation of environmental issues.  See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 at
http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/reorg.htm (last visited November 15, 2003).
56FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 212-213; Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS. 
LAW. 923, 924-925 (1990).
57
 Barr, supra note 56, at 924 (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 
F.Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). See also FREEDMAN supra note 30, at 120-121.
10
The Clean Air Act,58 the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),59 the Toxic Substances Control Act,60
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act61 designate toxic or hazardous 
substances, yet CERCLA has now become the “primary mechanism for governmental 
response actions” by offering a more comprehensive statutory coverage thereby eclipsing 
the other acts and other regulatory schemes.62
Due to the difficulty of CERCLA’s statutory language and the amount of 
evidence found in many of the CERCLA law suits, CERCLA actions have not only 
earned the label as complex litigation but also as some of the most complex cases brought 
in federal court.63  Most plaintiffs name multiple potentially responsible parties (“PRP”)
in search of one party to be jointly and severally liable creating complex procedures for 
parties to navigate.64 As parties step through the procedures in complex CERCLA 
litigation, they face the decision of trial by jury.
Statutory Analysis of CERCLA Sections 107 and 113
Two possible avenues for a right to trial by jury in the United States exist: either
(1) the statutory basis of the claim explicitly announces a right to a jury trial, or (2) the 
guarantee of a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
attaches because of the legal nature of the action and remedies.65  “If Congress has 
58
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
59
 33 U.S.C. §§  1251-1376
60
 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 
61
 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
62 FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 222-225.
63 DAVID F. HERR, ANN. MANUEL COMPLEX LIT. 21.422 (3rd ed.). 
64
 Elbaum, supra note 15, at 358.
65
 Morgan v. Ameritech, 26 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1090-91 (C.D. Ill. 1998) citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 
189 (1974).  “A right to trial by jury may arise either by statute or via the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.” Id. at 191-192 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of 
Educ., 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994).  “The Seventh Amendment thus requires a jury trial upon demand if the 
11
provided for the right to trial by jury in a statute, there is no need to examine the 
constitutional issue.”66
When interpreting statutes, the elementary rule is to first look at the plain 
language of the statute.67 If the plain reading of the statute provides the clear answer to 
the question presented, the inquiry ends.68 However, ambiguities often exist causing a 
controversy to be resolved by the courts.69  Nevertheless, legislatures do not enact statutes 
within a vacuum.70  Practitioners and judges alike have multiple resources, such as the 
congressional record, at their disposal to investigate the ambiguities and determine the 
true intent of the legislature.71 These resources will be utilized in order to determine 
whether Congress, indeed, intended for a jury trial to attach.
Two provisions within CERCLA provide plaintiffs with the ability to recover 
expenses related to the clean up of hazardous waste.  The first provision – section 9607 
(also known as “CERCLA section 107”) – specifically outlines who is liable for which 
actions.72 The second provision – section 9613 (also known as “CERCLA section 113”)
statute creates legal rights and remedies that are ‘enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary 
courts of law.’”  Id. at 828.
66
 Morgan, 26 F.Supp.2d at 1090-1091.  Kobs v. Arrow Service Bureau, Inc., 134 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1998): 
[T]here are two possible sources of a right of trial by jury for a statutory cause of action. 
Congress may provide for trial by jury in the statute that creates the claim regardless of 
whether the claim involves rights and remedies of the type traditionally enforced in a 
court of law before a jury.  Alternatively, if the claim involves rights and remedies of the 
type traditionally enforced in an action at law, the Seventh Amendment requires that the 
right of jury trial be preserved.
Id. at 896.
67
 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).  “It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in 
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed.”  Id. at 485.  ABNER J. MIKVA & 
ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 9-16 
(1997); NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.01 (4th ed. 1984).
68 MIKVA  et al, supra note 67, at 9-16. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). “Where . . . the resolution of 
a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory 
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.” Id. at 896.
69
 U.S. v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 2002).
70
 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001).
71
 Shallus v. U.S., 162 F. 653 (4th Cir. 1908).  “[T]o ascertain [the purpose of Congress] we are entitled to 
consider its records and debates upon the subject . . .”  Id. at 656.
72
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a):
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– allows plaintiffs to seek contribution from the liable parties.73 The statutory language in 
CERCLA, including sections 107 and 113, fails to explicitly address whether Congress 
granted a jury trial.74 However, statutory analysis does not end there because legislative 
history may provide further insight into whether Congress intended a right to a jury trial.75
Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; “comparable 
maturity” date Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the 
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section--(1) the owner and operator of a vessel 
or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,(3)
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, 
or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing 
such hazardous substances, and(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which 
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for--(A)
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a 
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;(B) any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national 
contingency plan;(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, 
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting 
from such a release; and(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study 
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
73
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f):
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under 
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be 
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate 
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines 
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring 
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title 
or section 9607 of this title.
Id.  (emphasis supplied).  For additional discussion on the nexus between §§ 107 and 113, see William D. 
Araiza, Text, Purpose, and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 193 (1996).
74
 CERCLA §§ 107 & 113, supra notes 72 & 73.  American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 
F.Supp. 209 (D.R.I. 1993).  “The statute does not expressly state whether an action under § 113(f)(1) is to 
be tried before a jury.”  Id. at 212.  
75
 Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994).  “If the statute and its legislative 
history are silent regarding the right to a jury trial, then we must ask whether a jury trial is constitutionally 
required under the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 155.  American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212.  “That 
the statute does not expressly provide for jury trials does not end the matter. Legislative intent, if 
discernible, must be consulted.” Id. (citations omitted).
13
CERCLA has a reputation not only for its comprehensive approach to 
environmental response, but also for its inept drafting.   The U.S. Supreme Court has
berated CERCLA’s language as “poorly drafted, hastily considered, and bereft of a useful 
legislative history.”76  Even the legislators themselves conceded CERCLA leaves much to 
be desired.77  CERCLA is far from “a model of legislative draftsmanship.”78  Vague 
provisions, indefinite or contradictory legislative history, lack of legislative history for 
certain provisions and lack of committee or conference reports plague the CERCLA 
sections of code.79
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, courts believe Congress made the general 
purpose of CERCLA quite clear.80 Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).81 With the SARA 
amendment, Congress added section 113 to CERCLA, which did not exist in the original 
CERCLA provisions.82 By enacting SARA, Congress sought to fill the holes in CERCLA 
76 FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 212 n.355 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
77
 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 34 (1982)
78
 Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986); ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE 
COMPENDIUM I-1 (1992).
79 LIGHT, supra note 78, at I-1. See also Beverly Z. Alexander, CERCLA 1980-1985: A Research Guide, 
13 ECOLOGY L. Q. 311, 312 (1986).
80
 Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.Supp. at 1290 n.6 (1987).
81
 American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212.  “Section 113(f)(1) was added to CERCLA by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) 
(“SARA”), and codified a right to contribution which had already been implied by numerous courts under 
federal common law.”  Id.  For discussion on CERCLA § 9607, see also California Dept. of Toxic 
Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002); U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp. 
722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D. N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 
400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp. 
3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v. 
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
82
 American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212.
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and provide a more adequate legislative history.83 However, neither the legislative history 
of CERCLA nor its SARA amendment explicitly addresses the right to trial by jury.84
Seventh Amendment Analysis
Since the plain language of CERCLA and legislative history fail to explicitly 
address the issue of jury trials, courts have invoked their right to interpret the statute 
under a Seventh Amendment analysis.85 This section discusses the Seventh Amendment 
analysis used by U.S. courts and then examines how the courts have applied the analysis 
to CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions.  
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.86
The ambiguity surrounding the issue arises from the phrase “Suits at common law.”  In
determining whether suits fall under the purviews of “Suits at common law,” the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Tull v. United States87 laid out the two-prong Seventh Amendment 
analysis: (1) the court must first compare the statutory action to similar actions brought in 
eighteenth-century English courts prior to the merger of law and equity,88 and (2) the 
83 LIGHT, supra note 78, at I-2.
84
 American Cyanamid Co., 669 F.Supp. at 212-13.
85
 California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 
U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp. 722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D. 
N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of 
Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 
209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other 
grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert. 
denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
86
 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
87
 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
88 Id. at 417-18.
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court must examine the remedy sought to determine whether or not it sounds in law or 
equity.89 At common law, courts of law granted jury trials to claims brought in their 
courts while courts of equity generally denied the right to a jury trial.90 Under the current 
Seventh Amendment doctrine, when parties present both equitable and legal issues in one 
case, courts will recognize the right to a jury trial.91  Therefore the action must be 
considered purely equitable for courts to deny the right to trial by jury under the Seventh 
Amendment analysis.92
Scholars and courts alike have criticized the first prong of the analysis because of 
its requirement to search the tomes of history.  Many courts, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court, appear to discount the importance of viewing the action and remedy before them 
in light of eighteenth-century (or earlier) law and procedure.93 The search into the 
historical developments of the courts for the closest analog to the present day case may 
appear “abstruse”94 or “quite rare,”95 but the Court always conducts the historical search.96
At the conclusion of the search, the Court uses its findings as the basis for its decision in 
Seventh Amendment cases.97  The Court ultimately attempts to find an analogous claim at 
89 Id.
90 PROFFATT, supra note 4, at 129.
91
 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
92
 Marozan v. U.S., 90 F.3d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1996) (“no right to a jury trial on purely equitable 
issues”); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 
F.2d 116, 123 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Articles of Drug Consisting of Following: 5,609 Boxes, 745 F.2d 
105, 112 (1st Cir. 1984); Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1982); Klein v. Shell 
Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967).
93
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 421; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1979).
94
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 421.
95
 Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 225 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissent).
96
 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217.  The historical analysis of the law-equity dichotomy will always be pursued 
by the Court in Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury cases.  Id.
97
 Tull, 481 U.S. at  412; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225. 
16
common law where the action and the remedy correlate to the present action.98 However, 
the Court has considered the second prong of the Tull analysis more important.99
Even though multiple federal courts have denied the right to trial by jury in 
CERCLA cost-recovery actions,100 courts have acknowledged that parties can make a 
good argument for a right to a jury trial,101 and the argument has been persuasive.102  In 
denying the right to a jury trial, the courts have simply stated that the claims are equitable
in nature and therefore are not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment.103  The syllogism used by these courts is as follows: the Seventh 
Amendment right does not attach to purely equitable claims; CERCLA cost-recovery and 
contribution actions are analogous to purely equitable restitution claims; therefore, 
CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions are equitable in nature without a right to 
trial by jury.104 This widely adopted analysis appears, on the surface, pellucid, but
fundamental flaws exist.
First of all, courts should not analogize CERCLA cost-recovery actions to 
restitution actions.  CERCLA cost-recovery actions are statutory actions,105 and restitution 
98
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 n.6.
99
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 421.
100
 California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 
U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp. 722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D. 
N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of 
Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 
209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other 
grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert. 
denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
101
 G.L. Industries of Michigan, Inc. v. Forstmann-Little, 800 F.Supp. 695, 699 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
102
 New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 881 F.Supp. 101 (1995) aff’d, 91 F.3d 353 (2nd Cir. 1996).  However, 
in affirming on other grounds, the Second Circuit footnoted their criticism of the District Court’s 
recognition of a right to trial by jury under CERCLA § 107.  Lashins, 91 F.3d at 362 n.7.  
103
 Northeastern, 810 F.2d  at 726. 
104
 Hatco, 59 F.3d at 411-414.; Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 749. 
105
 International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F.Supp. 466, 470 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) citing
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F.Supp. 1049, 1055 (D.C. Ariz. 1984): “Mardan's lawsuit is 
based not upon warranty theory but rather upon the statutory cause of action created by Section 107(a) of 
CERCLA.”  See also FREEDMAN, supra note 56, at 329-332; but cf,. Trimble v. ASARCO, Inc., 83 F.Supp. 
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actions are common-law, quasi-contract actions, not statutory.106 A statutory cause of 
action exists when a party violates the clear language of a constitutional provision, statute 
or regulation,107 and CERCLA clearly provides a cost recovery action in section 107.108
Both common-law tort actions and statutory actions stem from the same vein with the 
fundamental difference being that statutes create the legal duty,109 and statutes such as 
CERCLA impose strict liability.110  The U.S. Supreme Court in Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson111 stated,
Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or 
declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the 
plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally 
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting 
from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.’  And ‘[m]oney damages are, of 
course, the classic form of legal relief.112
When parties breach their duty imposed by CERCLA and related regulations 
promulgated by the EPA, plaintiffs may seek money damages, a legal relief, in a cost-
recovery or contribution action.113  For courts to analogize CERCLA cost-recovery and 
2d 1034, 1039 (D. Neb. 1999) (held no statutory cause of action under CERCLA §§ 107 and 113 for 
private property owners); Waste, Inc. Remedial Design/Remedial Action Group v. Cohn, 60 F.Supp. 2d 
833 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (standing for the proposition that citizens, as opposed to government entities, do not 
have a statutory cause of action under CERCLA §§ 107 or 113).
106 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 4 & 6 (1978) (the law of restitution developed from a 
quasi-contract theory and quasi-contract theory originates in early English common law); U.S. v. P/B 
STCO 213, ON 527 979, 756 F.2d 364, 375 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior 
Court of Del. In and For New Castle County, 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1961) (restitution claims are common law 
claims that do not fall under federal statutory law).
107
 Griggs v. Coca-Cola Employee’s Credit Union, 909 F.Supp. 1066, 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
108 See supra text accompanying note 72.
109
 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 195 (1974) (“A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort--
the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the 
injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach”);  Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001); Carter v. U.S., 333 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2003) (“An injury resulting 
from the violation of a statute (or other source of a legal duty, such as the regulation concerning treatment 
options on which the plaintiff relies) is actionable under tort law only if the statute was intended to avert the 
kind of injury that occurred”).  
110
 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d. 1032 (2nd  Cir. 1985).  It is well settled law that CERCLA § 
107 imposes a strict liability standard on defendants.  Id. at 1043-44; FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 219.
111
 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
112
 534 U.S. at 210 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
113 Id.
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contribution actions to restitution shows they accept the flawed premise that common-law 
actions and statutory actions are identical in nature when in fact they are quite different.114
Courts should instead analogize CERCLA cost-recovery actions to common law nuisance 
or trespass claims – the predecessor actions of CERCLA.
Second, CERCLA cost recovery actions are not purely equitable in nature because 
the statutory language fails to focus on pure restitution.  As seen from a plain reading of 
the language in CERCLA sections 107 and 113, plaintiffs may seek remedies aside from 
restitution.115  CERCLA section 107 provides for compensation for damage to natural 
resources which sounds in tort or trespass and not restitution.116 It is well-settled law that 
tort and trespass actions sound in law and not equity.117 Since parties liable under section
107 may fall within section 113,118 courts may reasonably infer the same focus of
restitution and natural resource damage applies to section 113.119  The courts, as 
previously mentioned, have held the Seventh Amendment protection fails only if the 
action is purely equitable in nature.120  Since CERCLA cost-recovery actions are not 
purely equitable restitution actions and contain certain legal aspects, the Seventh 
Amendment should preserve the right to trial by jury.
114 Infra note 188. The crucial difference between suits at law and equity pivots on how they entered the 
judicial system.  Suits at law found their bases in writs or statutes and suits at equity did not require such 
bases.  
115
 New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 881 F.Supp. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
116
 Lashins, 881 F.Supp. at 104 (1995): “A plain reading of CERCLA reveals that pure equitable restitution 
of money is not the focus of Section 107.”
117 Id.
118
 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) supra note 73.
119
 Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995). Courts have recognized the nexus between 
section 107 and 113.  
120
 Marozan v. U.S., 90 F.3d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1996) (“no right to a jury trial on purely equitable 
issues”); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 
F.2d 116, 123 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Articles of Drug Consisting of Following: 5,609 Boxes, 745 F.2d 
105, 112 (1st Cir. 1984); Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1982); Klein v. Shell 
Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying notes 91 & 92 and Dairy Queen, 
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 472-73.
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Even though the Court has considered restitution actions purely equitable in the 
past,121 the pendulum has swung as the Court now recognizes restitution as a claim with at 
least a hybrid nature.122  The U.S. Supreme Court has most recently held in Great-West 
that restitution sounds in both law and equity. “Thus, ‘restitution is a legal remedy when 
ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy . . . when ordered in an equity case,’ and 
whether it is legal or equitable depends on ‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the 
nature of the underlying remedies sought.”123  The Court embraced the analysis of Reich 
v. Continental Casualty Co.124 in reaching its conclusion that restitution is equitable in an 
equity case and legal when used in a case at law.125  This conclusion effectively elevates 
the first prong of Tull.
Third, the purpose of CERCLA – in addition to providing cost recovery – is to 
penalize.126 If a site is determined to be in need of environmental cleanup, CERCLA 
section 104127 has given government agencies several courses of action to accomplish the 
121
 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710, (1999).
122
 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
123 Id.  The Court also said, “However, not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in 
equity.”  Id. at 212.
124
 33 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1994).
125
 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; infra note 188.
126
 Compare CERCLA § 107, supra note 72, and CERCLA § 104, infra note 127.
127
 42 U.S.C. § 9604:
 (a) Removal and other remedial action by President; applicability of national 
contingency plan; response by potentially responsible parties; public health threats; 
limitations on response; exception:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of 
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of 
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an 
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is 
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for 
the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, 
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated 
natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national 
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health or 
welfare or the environment. When the President determines that such action will be done 
properly and promptly by the owner or operator of the facility or vessel or by any other 
responsible party, the President may allow such person to carry out the action, conduct 
the remedial investigation, or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with section 
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task.  First, government agencies may order a party to “abate such a danger or threat” by 
issuing an administrative order.128  Second, the agency may also seek injunctive relief in 
federal district court ordering the responsible party to clean up the site.129 Finally, as 
previously discussed, the agency may itself abate the potential danger by cleaning up the 
site, and then, under section 107, bring suit against the PRP to recover the costs
incurred.130  If the PRP fails to comply with the administrative order or the injunctive 
relief granted by the court, the PRP could be held liable under section 107 and also may 
incur penalties under section 9606.131 The penalties under section 9606 are substantial, as 
the fines can be up to $25,000 per day and treble damages.132
The fact that CERCLA includes not only a basis for recovery of damages in 
connection to environmental harm, but also penalties if a defendant breaches a duty,
communicates an intention by Congress to penalize offenders.  The Court in Tull
recognized penalties under the CWA as legal in nature.133  This connection between the 
penalties in section 106 of CERCLA and the cost-recovery action in section 107 allows 
plaintiffs to bring both actions in tandem creating a mixture of an obvious legal action
9622 of this title. No remedial investigation or feasibility study (RI/FS) shall be 
authorized except on a determination by the President that the party is qualified to 
conduct the RI/FS and only if the President contracts with or arranges for a qualified 
person to assist the President in overseeing and reviewing the conduct of such RI/FS and 
if the responsible party agrees to reimburse the Fund for any cost incurred by the 
President under, or in connection with, the oversight contract or arrangement. In no event 
shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a lesser standard of liability, receive 
preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether direct or indirect, benefit from any 
such arrangements as a response action contractor, or as a person hired or retained by 
such a response action contractor, with respect to the release or facility in question. The 
President shall give primary attention to those releases which the President deems may 
present a public health threat.
Id.
128
 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
129 Id.; U.S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
130 Supra note 72.
131
 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
132
 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1); BENDER, supra note 27, § 4A.02(1)(c)(V).
133
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23.
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(the penalties) and one that courts view as equitable (cost recovery).134  The court must 
grant a jury trial in such an event because it cannot refuse such a request when legal and 
equitable actions intermingle.135
The Seventh Amendment analysis applies to cost-recovery and contribution 
actions, but the nuances of CERCLA sections 107 and 113 present somewhat different 
results.  Section 107 is considered to be antecedent to section 113.136  Because of this 
connection, courts have often applied the section 107 Seventh Amendment analysis and 
then concluded that the section 113 action also fails because of the antecedent “equitable” 
claim.137  Many of the courts that denied the right to trial by jury simply performed the 
mechanics of the Seventh Amendment analysis, but they failed to correctly conclude no 
action at common law is analogous to these modern section 113 contribution actions.138
The court in Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co.139 performed an extensive, in-depth analysis of 
the eighteenth-century English courts’ treatment of “contribution” actions.140  However, 
the court accepts the term “contribution” without considering the ramifications.  
No analog to modern contribution actions exist because the common law courts 
rejected the doctrine of contribution among joint tortfeasors.  Dean Prosser said “the 
common law rule [was] that there can be no contribution among those who are regarded 
as ‘joint tortfeasors.’”141 The rule against contribution reigned for over one-hundred years 
where, during that time, only nine American jurisdictions contradicted the rule without 
134 Supra text accompanying note 128.
135
 Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-418 and supra text accompanying notes 89 & 90.
136
 American Cyanamid Company, 814 F.Supp. 209 (D.R.I. 1993); Smith, supra note 15.
137
 American Cyanamid Company, 814 F.Supp. at 213-214 (1993).
138
 Hatco, 859 F.Supp. at 773; American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp at 214; United States v. Shaner, 23 
Envtl. L. Rep. 20236 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
139
 Hatco, 59 F.3d 400. 
140
 Hatco, 59 F.3d at 412-414.
141PROSSER, supra note 36, § 50.
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legislation.142  This rule prevailed until the 1970s when legislatures began accepting the 
“cogent criticism” against disallowing contribution.143  “The great majority of our courts 
proceeded to apply [the rule] generally.”144  With no state legislation enacted that allowed 
contribution in the eighteenth century, the general rule against contribution controlled.145
Therefore, contribution actions essentially did not exist at common law and lack any 
common law analog.
One court has recognized a right to trial by jury in CERCLA contribution actions.  
The Federal District court in United States v. Shaner146 held the right to trial by jury does 
exist because contribution actions are legal in nature.147 Even though the court did not 
perform an extensive application of the Seventh Amendment analysis, it did perform an
important part: examining whether the remedy sounds in law or equity.148 The court said:
[I]t is plain that the obligation of a joint tort-feasor to contribute arises out 
of the tort and the fact that one seeking contribution has paid more than his 
fair and just share. The word ‘equitable’ as mentioned in the decisions 
does not mean a matter for chancery. It does not mean ‘equity’ as opposed 
to ‘law.’ It is founded upon natural justice, and when words ‘equitable’ or 
‘equity’ are used, reference is made to an attempt to do right and to deal 
fairly between the parties. Nonetheless, it is a legal right enforced in 
actions at law where the parties have a right to a jury trial.149
The Shaner court also looked to Palmer v. United States150 in support of its conclusion
where the Ninth Circuit held that “[r]ecovery of damages is a remedy traditionally 
granted by common law courts”; therefore the right to trial by jury attaches because 
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.; Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
145 Id.
146
 23 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20236.
147 Id. at 3.
148 Id.
149 Id. (emphasis supplied.)
150
 652 F.2d 893, 895-896 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
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contribution actions sound in law.151  Contribution actions more closely resemble natural 
resource recovery actions than cost-recovery actions, and other courts have indicated the 
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury attaches to CERCLA contribution actions.152
As a procedural matter, some plaintiffs bring CERCLA sections 107 and 113 
actions in tandem.153  When plaintiffs pursue such a cause of action, the right to trial by 
jury attaches because courts have recognized either cost-recovery actions or contribution 
actions are legal in nature and bringing both equitable and legal actions does not waive 
the right to trial by jury.154
Thus far, the issue has been further refined: whether eighteenth-century analogs to 
cost-recovery and contribution actions sound in courts of law or courts of equity.  By 
examining the U.S. history of environmental law, CERCLA statutes, congressional 
record, and the application of the Seventh Amendment analysis, eighteenth-century 
history of English courts holds the key to the answer.  The Court has declared on 
numerous occasions this continues to be the polestar in the Seventh Amendment 
analysis.155  Lower courts have held that the eighteenth-century analogs sound in equity, 
but did the court choose the proper analog?  Did the analog action offer an identical or 
similar remedy?
II. ENGLAND
CERCLA Section 107 and 113 Counterparts
151 Id.
152
 Shaner, 23 Envtl. L. Rep, at 4  n.2-4.
153
 American Cyanamid Company, 814 F.Supp. 209.
154 See Dairy Queen, Inc, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) and supra text accompanying note 91.  For a more in-depth 
analysis of other important procedural differences between CERCLA §§ 107 and 113 such as standing, 
statute of limitations, and interaction with CERCLA § 122 contribution actions, see SUSAN M. COOKE, THE 
LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §16.01[4][a]-[c] 
(1999) and ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE §10.1-2 (1992).  See 
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England has a proud history of environmental regulation, since it was one of the 
first countries to develop laws regulating the environment.156  With the Industrial 
Revolution157 producing mass amounts of pollution affecting England’s towns and 
countrysides, the British faced the reality of environmental destruction.158 The “dark 
satanic mills” dotting the landscape throughout Britain spewed plumes of soot and 
smoke, the evil side of the glorious Industrial Revolution where society worshipped 
innovation at its own expense.159 The death rate in 1875 equaled the highest rate in 
England in its previous forty years while infant mortality remained at incredibly high 
levels.160 Thankfully the cries of humanity opposing the exchange of the health of a great 
nation for the Almighty Pound awakened the consciences of the politicians.161  With
156 SIMON BALL & STUART BELL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO THE 
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (3rd ed. 1991).
157
 The Industrial Revolution began in England in the eighteenth century and spread throughout the world.  
THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, vol. 6, 304-305 (15th ed. 1997).  The Revolution brought 
technological, socioeconomical, and cultural changes as the economies of nations changed from agrarian to 
machine and industrial.  Id.  From 1769 until 1830 the Revolution remained, for the most part, in England.  
Id.
158 BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9.
159 DAVID HUGHES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-8 ((2nd ed. 1992).  One of the harshest critics of the Industrial 
Revolution was Charles Dickens, the most popular literary figure of his time.  DANIELLE  DUBAS, foreward 
pg. viii in CHARLES DICKENS (Dorset Press, N.Y. 1994).  Dickens grew up during the height of the 
Industrial Revolution in England as he was born in 1812 in Portsea, England and died 58 years later in 
1870:
From the stagecoaches in The Pickwick Papers to the belching smokestacks of Coketown 
in Hard Times, industry is forever on the rise throughout [Dickens’] books.  The sign of 
industrialism – smokestacks, furnaces, locomotives – are always ominously connected 
with disillusionment, failure, even death.  But the characters who are the most intensely 
steeped in this new industrialism either see the light, like Scrooge in A Christmas Carol
and Gradgrind in Hard Times, or are defeated and demolished in true villain fashion, for 
Dickens was a moralist.
Id.
160 HUGHES, supra note 159, at 3.
161 Id.
25
public health problems increasing, Parliament responded by enacting the Public Health 
Act of 1875, a “landmark” act.162
Historians also credit Britain with establishing the world’s first “national public 
pollution control agency” when Parliament enacted the Alkali Act of 1863 that, in turn, 
created the Alkali Inspectorate, an agency created to control “atmospheric emissions 
primarily from the caustic soda industry.”163 The enactment of the Public Health Act and 
the Alkali Act does not encompass all of English environmental law because English 
environmental law, like the United States, does not limit itself to statutory cause of 
actions; common law actions also exist to remedy environmental destruction.164  This 
discussion will begin by looking to the origins of the English environmental law and 
observe the progress through the years ultimately discovering the CERCLA sections 107 
and 113 counterpart(s). 
 Laws regulating the public environment date back to the beginning of English 
common law under the writ of trespass.  An action of trespass would lie if a “man’s body, 
goods or land have been unlawfully touched.”165  The writ of trespass – “the most general 
term that there is”166 – separates into two separate types of actions: felonies to be 
prosecuted and lesser trespasses where a felony is not pleaded.167  Actions under the writ 
of trespass originally concerned mostly criminal matters, but civil claims did exist.168
Blackstone also recognized the action of trespass when a person damaged the “herbage” 
162 BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9.  The 1875 Act brought much needed uniformity to the regulation of 
public health in general providing a model governmental authorities would use in planning towns and 
communities around these health concerns.  Id.
163 Id.
164
 Green, supra note 29, at 541-542.
165 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I 526 (2nd ed. 1952).  
166 Id.at 512.
167 Id. at 511.
168 Id. at 511-12, 534.
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or spoiled the corn of a neighbor.169  These actions allowed the plaintiff to recover 
damages “however as the jury think proper to assess.”170 The common law actions for 
environmental harm do not limit themselves to trespass actions, but also include 
nuisance.
The law eventually developed into nuisance where public nuisance became the 
cause of action for harm committed by a “direct encroachment” of a public right or 
property creating a common injury.171 The use of nuisance law theory in environmental 
harm cases is not a novel idea.172 One of the earliest cases involving nuisance, and 
arguably the first environmental law case, is William Aldred’s Case.173 Long before 
Blackstone’s Commentaries were published from 1765-1769,174 the King’s Bench in 1611 
heard William Aldred’s Case involving a plaintiff affected by the  noxious odors of swine
on a neighbor’s property.175  The defendant pleaded not guilty arguing “one ought not to 
have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs.”176  The King’s Bench 
applied the law of nuisance holding the plaintiff should recover.177  The court reached its 
holding by using an “environmental analogy”:178
And the building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be built so 
near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof enters into the house, so 
that none can dwell there, an action lies for it. So if a man has a 
watercourse running in a ditch from the river to his house, for his 
necessary use; if a glover sets up a lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins 
so near the said watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has 
169 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 165.
170 Id.
171 H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES 38 (3rd ed. 1893).
172
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174 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, vol. I at iii. 
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corrupted it, for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on 
the case lies for it . . . 179
The doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes (“one should use his own property in
such a manner as not to injure that of another”) was born.180  The English courts continued 
to apply the doctrine at the time of Blackstone: “[T]he rule is, ‘sic utere tuo, ut alienum 
non laedes’.”181 In describing nuisance, Blackstone also said, “As to nuisance to one’s 
lands: if one erects a smelting house for lead so near the land of another, that the vapour 
[sic] and smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages his cattle therein, this is held to be 
a nuisance.”182  England continued applying the strict liability standard of the sic utere tuo
rule until the 1960s.183
This application of sic utere tuo continued into modern times.  In the seminal 
1868 case that resides in all modern torts casebooks, Rylands v. Fletcher,184 the House of 
Lords reaffirmed the classic sic utere tuo common law rule.185 However, in the 1960s, the 
House of Lords began using the doctrine of foreseeability to weaken the rule.186
Nevertheless, the development of nuisance law created the means for private individuals 
to seek redress for environmental harm.187 The remedies available include the costs of 
clean-up essential to restore the property to its previous condition, or the difference 
between the property value before the pollution and afterward.188
179 Id.; 5 Coke’s Reports 58 (1611).
180
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181 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 169.
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187 BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9
188 Id. at 190-191.  The origins of trespass and nuisance found in writs and statutes differs from that of 
restitution.  Courts of Chancery – discussed in infra text accompanying notes 253-261 – entertained claims 
of restitution which did not require a statutory basis.  JOHN W. WADE, RESTITUTION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1 (1958).  While restitution actions for recovery of something detained, or restoring the 
plaintiff, were considered legal, the procedural difficulties forced many to seek redress in the Court of 
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Apart from the common law, England has also developed statutory law protecting 
the environment.  The Public Health Act of 1875 began a new era in English 
environmental law eventually producing numerous other acts designed to control 
pollution.189 Parliament also passed the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876190 and the 
Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act of 1909.  These, however, were largely unenforceable 
in practice and contained non-obligatory regulations vesting control in local authorities.191
Prior to these acts, the governmental agencies, set forth to enforce the laws during the 
Victorian era, failed to operate efficiently as the division of their responsibilities 
separated urban and rural authorities.192 The administrative agencies lacked the 
cohesiveness and structure to effectively manage the responsibilities placed upon them by 
the various statutory acts.193 Many of the legislative acts covered environmentally 
conscious issues such as “nuisances, sewage and sanitation, vaccination, [and] 
diseases,”194 but compliance with the regulations was merely “permissive and not 
mandatory.”195
From these notions of public health came the more specific regulation of waste 
relating to pollution of water, air and land as the courts responded to discharges of waste 
that polluted the environment.196  English law may have been the first in many different 
areas of environmental law, but they, like the proverbial hare in Aesop’s Fable “The Hare 
Chancery.  Id.  This further supports the classification of restitution as having a dual nature as discussed in 
supra text accompanying notes 121-125.
189 BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 14.
190 Id. at 9.
191 BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9.
192 HUGHES, supra note 159, at 4.
193 Id. at 3.
194 Id. at 4.
195 Id.
196 Id.; BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9.
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and the Tortoise,”197 rested on their accomplishments and did little in the form of 
environmental law until the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s, when the United States
began its development of statutory environmental law plodding steadily ahead of 
England.198
The 1960s and 1970s brought the modern age of environmental law into England, 
and England has rapidly changed ever since.199  The focus of the modern environmental 
laws in England is “on the control of pollution, and the growing concern . . . [of] 
hazardous substances and processes, [and the] minimization and management of 
waste.”200  The change of national focus vaulted environmental policy into a prominent 
place in English public policy.201
The current path of English environmental law is turning more towards 
preventing harm and consolidation of regulation.202 Parliament passed the Environmental 
Protection Act of 1990203 which became one of the predominant environmental statutes in 
England.204 The 1990 Act promotes integration of pollution controls – considered the 
most important feature of the Act.205 The 1990 Act also, among other things, “empowers 
the Secretary of State for the Environment to set statutory emission limits, restricting the 
concentration of any substance that may be released by a prescribed process, and enables 
him to establish quality objectives and standards for any environmental medium.”206 The 
197
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198 Infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
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202 Id. at 11, 14.
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 John Gibson, the Integration of Pollution Control, in LAW, POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 29 (Robin 
Churchill, et al, ed. 1991).  
206 Id. at 22.  The 1990 Act itself states a more comprehensive purpose:
An Act to make provision for the improved control of pollution arising from certain 
industrial and other processes; to re-enact the provisions of the Control of Pollution Act 
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1990 Act does provide the Secretary of State to recovery costs though the scheme is quite 
different from CERCLA section 107.207  The costs recovered generally related to the 
regulation of companies.208  Each new applicant must pay an initial fee when it seeks
authorization for its processes; this enables the Secretary of State to recover their costs 
incurred in regulation.209 England did not end its environmental regulation here since it
followed the Act of 1990 with the Environment Act of 1995.210
Section 57 of the Environment Act of 1995 correlates with CERCLA sections 107 
and 113.211  In short, the 1995 Act, and related guidance (“the 1995 Act”), authorizes the 
1974 relating to waste on land with modifications as respects the functions of the 
regulatory and other authorities concerned in the collection and disposal of waste and to 
make further provision in relation to such waste; to restate the law defining statutory 
nuisances and improve the summary procedures for dealing with them, to provide for the 
termination of the existing controls over offensive trades or businesses and to provide for 
the extension of the Clean Air Acts to prescribed gases; to amend the law relating to litter 
and make further provision imposing or conferring powers to impose duties to keep 
public places clear of litter and clean; to make provision conferring powers in relation to 
trolleys abandoned on land in the open air; to amend the Radioactive Substances Act 
1960; to make provision for the control of genetically modified organisms; to make 
provision for the abolition of the Nature Conservancy Council and for the creation of 
councils to replace it and discharge the functions of that Council and, as respects Wales, 
of the Countryside Commission; to make further provision for the control of the 
importation, exportation, use, supply or storage of prescribed substances and articles and 
the importation or exportation of prescribed descriptions of waste; to confer powers to 
obtain information about potentially hazardous substances; to amend the law relating to 
the control of hazardous substances on, over or under land; to amend section 107(6) of 
the Water Act 1989 and sections 31(7)(a), 31A(c)(i) and 32(7)(a) of the Control of 
Pollution Act 1974; to amend the provisions of the Food and Environment Protection Act 
1985 as regards the dumping of waste at sea; to make further provision as respects the 
prevention of oil pollution from ships; to make provision for and in connection with the 
identification and control of dogs; to confer powers to control the burning of crop 
residues; to make provision in relation to financial or other assistance for purposes 
connected with the environment; to make provision as respects superannuation of 
employees of the Groundwork Foundation and for remunerating the chairman of the 
Inland Waterways Amenity Advisory Council; and for purposes connected with those 
purposes. 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Ch. 43, Long Title (Eng.). 
207 Id. at 26.
208 Id.
209 Id.  The Secretary of State must authorize the processes of the company or else the operation of such 
unauthorized processes would be illegal.  Id. at 22.
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Environment Agency and a body corporate to be known as the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency; to provide for the transfer of functions, property, rights and liabilities 
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Environment Agency (“EA”) to seek reimbursement from the responsible parties and 
order the clean up of the contaminated land.212 The 1995 Act also sets out statutory duties 
of property owners or occupiers to clean up the contaminated site.213 Even though the 
origin of the contamination may go unknown, the 1995 Act imposes liability upon the 
current owner or occupier.214
The 1995 Act also defines the term “contaminated land” to assist governmental 
agencies in deciding whether the pollution qualifies as an environmental risk.215 Local 
agencies must determine if a “significant possibility of significant harm” exists creating 
terms of art left for interpretation by the statutory guidance.216  However, the 1995 Act
gave agencies a decision matrix to use in analyzing the harm.217 The pollution must have 
a source, “‘a receptor’ (a target which can be harmed) and ‘a pathway’ (a means of 
exposing the target to the pollutant).”218  Without this “pollution linkage,” the land is not 
contaminated.219
Once the agency classifies the land as contaminated, the remediation process may 
begin.  The local authority will issue a remediation notice to the targeted appropriate 
to those bodies and for the conferring of other functions on them; to make provision with 
respect to contaminated land and abandoned mines; to make further provision in relation 
to National Parks; to make further provision for the control of pollution, the conservation 
of natural resources and the conservation or enhancement of the environment; to make 
provision for imposing obligations on certain persons in respect of certain products or 
materials; to make provision in relation to fisheries; to make provision for certain 
enactments to bind the Crown; to make provision with respect to the application of 
certain enactments in relation to the Isles of Scilly; and for connected purposes.
Environment Act 1995, Ch. 25, Long Title (Eng.) (emphasis supplied).
212
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entities or persons responsible for the contaminated land if the appropriate entities do not 
report the contamination first.220  The remediation notice lays out the procedures so the 
appropriate persons properly clean up the contaminated land.221  Failure to comply with 
the remediation notice can result in penalties and fines, and the agency can take the 
appropriate persons to the High Court to enforce the remediation notice.222  Also, the local 
authority may even clean up the contaminated land if the responsible person failed to 
comply, or if the contamination creates an “imminent danger,” and then recover the costs 
of the remediation.223 The EA is equipped to perform the cleanup itself and then seek 
“reasonable costs” from the responsible parties with some limitation.224  This is almost 
identical to CERCLA section 107.
The 1995 Act also provides for contribution between liable parties.  The 
remediation process may take several years to finish, and even then the site may require 
continued observation.225  Obviously, this process can drive up costs.226  The 1995 Act 
provides for holding more than one party responsible for the remediation costs.227  The 
1995 Act gives local authorities guidelines in determining whether parties are liable and 
to what extent.228  The local authorities may group parties according to their liability and 
may exclude certain parties if they satisfy one of six tests given by the 1995 Act.229  The 
remaining Class A parties must then bear the costs of remediation to the exclusion of 
220 Id. at 177.
221 Id. at 178.
222 Id. at 178-179.
223 Id. at 179.
224
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Class B parties.230  The guidelines also allow apportionment within a class creating a 
contribution regime.231  The local authorities must apply three factors in determining 
“relative contributions”: (1) “quantities of pollutant present”; (2) “different time periods 
of occupation”; or (3) “the areas of the site occupied by the parties in the liability 
group.”232  The authorities may also require different class members to contribute.233  This 
element of the 1995 Act correlates strongly with CERCLA section 113 since both allow 
contribution actions.234
It is clear that the Environment Act of 1995 is a counterpart to CERCLA sections 
107 and 113.  Both provide bases for cost-recovery and contribution actions for 
contaminated land clean-up costs.  England’s legislation came twenty-five years after the 
U.S. Congress enacted CERCLA, but both countries now have statutory actions almost 
identical in these specific regards.  Now the next issue to discuss is whether the 
substantive similarities transfer into the procedural by looking at England’s use of jury 
trials in its environmental actions.
English Origins of Trial by Jury in Environmental Actions
To understand whether an environmental cost-recovery or contribution action 
under U.S. law sounds in law or equity as required under the proper Seventh Amendment 
analysis,235 one must examine the types of actions in English courts at the end of the 
eighteenth century, since it is eighteenth century actions the Court will look to in finding 
a proper analog.  Furthermore, the historical analysis of the courts reveals the differences 
230
 Lee, supra note 213, at 184.
231 Id. at 184-185.
232 Id. at 185.
233 Id.
234
 Compare supra text accompanying note 233 with supra note 73.
235 Supra text accompanying note 96.
34
between environmental law predecessors and restitution actions.  Historical 
understanding not only benefits the analysis of the U.S. doctrine, but it also provides a 
foundation to realize the path England has chosen in substantially limiting its storied jury 
system.236  This discussion will continue to follow the English jury system past the 
eighteenth century through its precipitous decline into the present.
At common law when the United States ratified the Constitution, the English 
court system consisted of four different types of courts: the Court of the King’s Bench, 
the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery.237  The 
first three courts recognized the right to trial by jury while the Court of Chancery, 
developed from King’s grant to a chancellor to fashion different types of equitable relief, 
did not.238
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trial by jury, his denouncing of traditional means of trial left the decision to the judges.  Id.  This writ, in 
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The King’s Bench possessed criminal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over inferior 
courts including civil suits.239 The King’s Bench was prohibited by the Magna Carta from 
hearing common pleas.240 Since the King’s Bench occupied itself with mainly criminal 
cases, trespass actions, appeals of felonies, and suits to correct errors made by lower 
courts (including the Court of Common Pleas), the caseload was quite small compared to 
Common Pleas.241
The Court of Common Pleas determined civil suits between two subjects,242 and 
this jurisdiction was general.243  These differed from the King’s Bench because in 
common pleas the king had no interest.244 William Holdsworth,245 the great English law 
historian, divided the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas into four areas: (1) real actions 
where fines and recoveries are sought, (2) correction of errors of the local courts,246 (3) 
issue prerogative writs (i.e. writs for habeas corpus), and (4) jurisdiction over its own 
officials.247 It is within the Court of Common Pleas that actions from the writ of trespass,
and its progeny nuisance, were brought.248  Furthermore, the right to trial by jury attached 
because it was a court of law.249
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The Exchequer of Pleas tried cases concerning revenue matters and eventually 
civil suits.250  During the late thirteenth century, the Exchequer heard common pleas, but 
Parliament soon limited this by legislative enactments.251  The jurisdiction of the 
Exchequer during the fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was limited to 
actions “by or against Exchequer personnel, sheriffs, and a few other officers who were 
bound to render accounts at the Exchequer.”252
Though the jurisdictions appeared rigid, by the eighteenth century, the three 
courts of the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer of Pleas overlapped 
substantially.253 The King’s Bench continued to focus on appellate work, but the three 
courts were considered “equal in status and authority and function.”254
Recognizing that remedies at common law in the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, 
or Exchequer often failed to satisfy conscientious notions of justice, England developed 
the doctrine of equity.255  The requirement of a right to trial by jury under a writ became 
more cumbersome as England developed economically and the expansion of writs did not 
250 SHEARWOOD, supra note 239, at 1.
251 BAKER, supra note 240, at 48.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 49-51.  
The Exchequer continued its proper revenue jurisdiction.  The Common Pleas kept a 
monopoly of the true real actions, because the King’s Bench bill procedure was confined 
to personal actions, and the Exchequer quominus was appropriate only to claims for 
money which could be applied in paying a national Crown debt.  Yet in reality these 
restrictions had come to mean very little . . . The only actions, therefore, in which the 
Common Pleas retained a true monopoly were real actions for those types of property not 
recoverable by ejectment: [advowson, writ of dower, and unassigned widow’s third share 
of husband’s land]. 
Id. at 50.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 103.  
Equity could award a complete remedy in each particular case.  Thus it could shape its 
decree so as to wind up a partnership, or could compel a person specifically to carry out 
an agreement he had made [i.e. specific performance], instead of merely giving damages 
for the breach, which might be totally inadequate; or could prevent by injunction 
anything being done, attaching the person of anyone disobeying; as Equity acted upon the 
person by the writ of subpoena. 
SHEARWOOD, supra note 239, at 3.
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match the pace of the expansion of individual rights.256  This is where the chancellor’s 
duties filled a void.257  The Court of Chancery granted the equitable relief fashioned in 
many different ways,258 and the Chancery granted such relief only if the courts of law 
provided no remedy or the remedy was inadequate.259  The Chancery mostly occupied 
itself with issues of “fraud, accident, and breach of confidence,”260 but the court 
distributed the greatest amount of equity in the area of trusts.261
The distinction between law and equity is quite simple: courts of law awarded 
money damages after an event occurred whereas courts of equity granted relief before an
event to prevent harm or wrongdoing.262 Since the only remedy at common law was 
damages,263 the injured party often found this remedy inadequate in the case of 
nuisance.264  If the injury was the result of an ongoing activity, damages would not cause 
the harmful acts to cease.265  The Court of Chancery would issue an injunction prohibiting 
the defendant from committing the actions that were the source of harm.266  For instance, 
if the nuisance action for damages in a court of law was successful, the problem may 
have not been solved as the defendant may continue interfering with the plaintiff’s 
property rights.267  Therefore, damages, or the remedy at law, would be inadequate and an 
injunctive remedy available in Chancery, in addition to legal remedies, would suffice.268
256 JOINER, supra note 4, at 41.
257 Id.
258 See BAKER, supra note 240, at 103.   
259 HANBURY & YARDLEY, supra note 236, at 97.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 JOINER, supra note 4, at 42.







It is clear that eighteenth-century trespass and nuisance actions sounded in courts 
of law where trial by jury was guaranteed.269 Both nuisance theory and the jury trial find 
their origins in the actions of Henry II.270 Seeking to centralize the laws of England, 
Henry II created the assize of nuisance which provided a remedy for landowners who 
sought relief from “‘things erected, made, or done’ on the defendant’s land.”271  While it 
originally sounded in criminal writ, since it was a branch of the writ of trespass,272
arguable dicta in a 1535 case expanded the theory to personal actions.273 The element 
which distinguished trespass from nuisance was where the defendant performed the act.274
If the act was performed on the plaintiff’s land, then trespass was the action; dissimilarly, 
if the act occurred on the defendant’s land, but hurt the plaintiff, then an action for 
nuisance would lie.275  Nevertheless, juries in the courts at common law still determined 
damages for the actions in trespass and nuisance.276
The decline in the use of trial by jury in England is legendary and well-
documented.277 Ironically, the deterioration of the jury system in England began its steep 
descent just as statutory environmental actions began passing through Parliament.278  The 
criticism of the jury system began as a relatively innocent academic exercise that sparked 
269 HANBURY & YARDLEY, supra note 236, at 65.
270
 Kathleen Ann O’Neil, Chemical Nuisance: Application of Public Nuisance Theory as a Remedy for 
Environmental Law Violations, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1992); supra note 236.
271
 O’Neil, supra note 270, at 54.
272 BAKER, supra note 240, Table A at 70.
273
 F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L. Q. REV. 480 (1949).
274 Id. at 482.
275 Id. at 481-482.
276 HANBURY & YARDLEY, supra note 236, at 65; BAKER, supra note 240, at 423.
277 DEVLIN, supra note 18, at 130.  “In [English] civil litigation there has been in the last century a marked 
decline not only in the popularity of trial by jury but also in the facilities that are afforded it.”  Id. MOORE, 
supra note 4, at 183-212. “Trial by jury is an ancient and democratic institution.  It will be seen later that it 
is also a declining one, particularly in civil cases.”  Id. at 183.  Moore also considers the trial by jury in the 
county courts to be “practically obsolete.”  Id. at 197.  See also SMITH, et al, supra note 12, at 1035.
278 MOORE, supra note 4, at 123-137.
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a fiery inferno engulfing the jury trial as was known by Blackstone, Coke, Glanville, and 
other jurists of old.279
A statute in 1854 appeared to make a minor change in the fact finding system of 
English courts, but this change began the erosion of trial by jury.280  The act was the 
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 which generally enabled judges to try facts without 
the help of a jury.281  However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the confidence 
placed in the jury system surprisingly was increasing.282  As a matter of fact, England had 
extended the right to trial by jury in divorce cases and probate cases with fifty percent of 
the divorce cases decided by a jury of peers.283  Even the United States did not decide 
divorce cases by a jury.284  England further expanded the use of jury trials to minor civil 
suits tried in county courts, but this would be the height of its use.285  The 1854 Act began 
to take its toll, for by the end of the nineteenth century juries tried only fifty percent of 
the civil trials whereas before the number was eighty or well-over ninety percent.286
Within a matter of several decades, hundreds of years of expansion and development of 
the jury system came crashing down.
The 1854 Act simply enabled parties to leave fact finding to a judge and 
established that a decision by a judge would have the same impact as a jury verdict.287
Moreover, the 1854 Act allowed parties to waive trial by jury in actions at Common Pleas 
where previously the courts only conducted jury trials.288 This change appears innocuous, 
279 LESSER, supra note 4, at 220.
280 BAKER, supra note 240, at 92.
281 Id.
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but practitioners and judges saw otherwise: “The very existence of an option made the 
decision to ask for a jury suspicious.”289  Such a decision placed counsel in a position to 
either offend the judges or choose a less desirable method of justice.290
The next hole in the bulwark of liberty was bored in 1883.  In that year, 
Parliament limited the types of cases where trial by jury was a matter of course.291
Parliament recognized six types of civil cases where the right to trial by jury attached:
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, and breach of 
promise of marriage.292  This act restricting the use of juries was a “war measure.”293
During this time, jury trials were available in other actions, but it required specific 
requests making jury trials the exception instead of the general rule.294 This rule became 
ever more restrictive when England implemented time limits for jury trial requests.295
This 1883 act was lifted in 1925, but new legislation continued the decline of jury trials.296
In 1933, Parliament enacted the Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act that 
virtually eliminated the jury trial.297  The Act took away any absolute right to a trial by 
jury, but allows juries in actions for fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, seduction, or breach of promise of marriage effectively adding one action 
to the 1883 act.298  The 1933 Act also granted courts the power to order a jury trial. 299
289 BAKER, supra note 240, at 92.  
290 MOORE, supra note 4, at 124.
291 DEVLIN, supra note 18, at 130.
292 Id.
293 MOORE, supra note 4, at 125-126.  This “war measure” was put in place as an emergency act to expire 
six months after the World War I.  DEVLIN, supra note 18, at 131.    
294 DEVLIN, supra note 18, at 130-131.
295 Id. at 131.
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However, courts have interpreted this power to apply only in exceptional cases.300 This 
newest act continued the assault and brought the number of jury trials in civil actions 
down to about twelve percent in 1935.301  Eventually, the number tumbled to around two 
or three percent in 1988.302
This English trend in the use of juries clearly affected trial by jury in 
environmental actions because courts of law hearing nuisance and trespass claims granted 
trial by jury during the eighteenth century before the decline began in the later half of the 
nineteenth century.303  Furthermore, the seven actions with qualified rights to trial by jury 
do not include any actions for environmental harm.304 Both the United States and 
England have overwhelmingly denied the right to trial by jury, but the United States has 
not had the broad retreat of the jury system found in English law.305  Yet another 
distinguishing fact about British law is how they have denied the right: England enacted 
statutes whereas the United States’ denial comes from lower-level judicial rulings.306 This
contrast in jurisprudence stirs well-founded questions concerning the underlying policy 
300 SMITH et al, supra note 12, at 1036.  The courts have given several factors to take into account in 
determining whether the action qualifies as exceptional:
[1] [N]eed for uniformity in the award of damages in personal injury cases, the jury being 
ignorant of the conventional figures in comparable cases; [2] that in such cases the 
severity or unusual nature of the injuries are not exceptional circumstances, but if they 
are unique or nearly so, jury trial may be appropriate; [3] the possibility of dishonesty or 
deliberate lying; [4] the fact that the honour and integrity of the person applying for jury 
trial may be at stake; [5] the fact that trial without a jury is speedier and less expensive; 
[6] the proposition that, in the circumstances, trial by judge alone is ‘more likely to 
achieve a just result than trial by jury.’  
Id. at 1036-1037.
301 DEVLIN, supra note 18, at 132.
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issue: what will be the outcome if the right to trial by jury in cost-recovery and 
contribution actions is granted?  
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
If a right to a jury trial in cost-recovery and contribution actions exists, such a 
right will alter litigation strategies.307  As a procedural matter, many judges (and parties 
for that matter) waive the right to trial by jury because many consider environmental 
cases so complex that juries would be inadequate decision makers.308  Furthermore, with 
the increase of jury awards in civil litigation, the thought of a multi-million dollar verdict 
strikes fear into the heart of every defendant’s counsel.  Yet both of these concerns are 
either unfounded or the disadvantages could easily be mitigated.
The main thrust of the argument contending the jury’s abilities in a complex civil 
case stems from the third factor of analysis for jury trials stated in Ross v. Bernhard: “the 
practical abilities and limitations of juries.”309 When courts consider the factors of length 
of trial, number of parties involved, number of issues involved, magnitude of the 
evidence, the complexity of the conceptual nature of the issue, and esoteric issues, they 
have found that a jury, even though the issues are firmly planted in law, could not issue a 
rational verdict because they could not understand the evidence, and could not make 
conclusions of law in an area completely foreign.310  However, the judicial process could 
easily remedy these potential problems by implementing a few minor changes.
307
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Faced with a jury trial in a complex litigation case such as a CERCLA action, 
judges may choose from a number of mechanisms to assist juries without sacrificing 
efficiency.  311  In distilling the issues down to the main points upon which the entire case 
turns, judges can encourage stipulations of facts, host pre-trial conferences to eliminate 
much of the procedural hurdles, and eliminate testimony irrelevant to the narrowed 
issues.312  Likewise, in breaking the conceptual aspects of complex litigation into palpable 
sections, judges may use various tools such as appointing a special master under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 who may summarize the expert witness testimony stating it in 
terms the average jury member could understand.313  In addition to the special master, 
judges themselves could alleviate the difficulty by mediating between the jurors and 
counsel when misunderstanding arises and drafting succinct but helpful jury 
instructions.314  These are just a few steps the judiciary can take in ensuring due process 
during a jury trial of environmental cost-recovery or contribution actions.  
The judiciary may prevent the second problem of excessive jury verdicts in a 
number of ways.  First, constitutional limitations placed on jury verdicts through the 
judge’s discretion under remittitur eliminate much of the concerns surrounding excessive 
jury verdicts.315  Second, if the defendant’s oppose the judgment, they can seek a 
judgment n.o.v., new trial, or appeal the decision.316  These avenues of justice ensure due 
process on both sides of the lawsuit while preserving the right to trial by jury.
311 See supra note 13, at 115.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The right to trial by jury is the last remaining vehicle of true democracy preserved 
in the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. citizens embrace their Seventh 
Amendment right and any denial of that right should undergo intense examination to 
ensure such a right was never intended by the framers of the Bill of Rights.  A proper 
historical analysis of cost-recovery and contribution actions under CERCLA provides 
overwhelming proof that the Seventh Amendment protects the right to trial by jury in the 
discussed CERCLA actions.
When the current decisions by the federal courts denying the right to a jury are 
properly analyzed, the correct conclusion becomes apparent.  Court should not analogize 
CERCLA actions to restitution actions because they are different in nature; nuisance or 
trespass claims are the proper analogs.  Moreover, the Court has classified restitution as 
having both legal and equitable qualities.  Ultimately, under the Tull two- prong analysis, 
the eighteenth century analogs in English courts determine the outcome.  English history 
offers tremendous guidance on this part. 
English environmental law, as in the United States, grew out of actions in 
nuisance and trespass, but England’s history is much deeper.  Courts applied the law of 
nuisance – an ancestor to modern environmental law – as early as 1611.  While the theory 
of law changed, the courts did not, for both nuisance and trespass actions seeking 
damages were heard in courts of law where the right to a jury attached.  The continuity 
between the English and American systems continued, to a certain extent, from the 
eighteenth century until late in the nineteenth century when the jury system in England 
began eroding.
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The decline of the English trial by jury reversed hundreds of years of legal
thought and ultimately denies the right to jury in environmental actions.  This 
development over the past 150 years stands in stark contrast to the United States.
Thankfully the United States did not follow England’s example.  
It is in defense of this “bulwark”317 and fear of its demise that courts should 
properly analyze the rights under the Seventh Amendment in CERCLA cost-recovery and 
contribution actions.  Many advantages to the trial by jury exist and courts can implement 
procedural tools minimize the disadvantages.  CERCLA offers a remedy at law, and 
under the Seventh Amendment, a jury of peers should determine the outcome.
317 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 275.
